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Abstract. As demonstrated by the revelations of Edward Snowden on
the extent of pervasive surveillance, one pressing danger is in the vast
predominance of unencrypted messages, due to the influence of the cen-
tralizing silos such as Microsoft, Facebook, and Google. We present the
threat model and architectural design of the LEAP platform and client
applications, which currently provisions opportunistic email encryption
combined with a VPN tunnel and cross-device synchronization.
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1 Introduction
Why in the era of mass surveillance is encrypted email still nearly impossible?
Take for example the case of the journalist Glenn Greenwald, who could not
properly set-up encrypted email when Edward Snowden contacted him to leak
the NSA secrets. This lack of progress in over three decades in securing emails
is precisely what allows both content and meta-data analysis of email by agen-
cies such as the NSA to be pervasive and nearly inescapable. Well-understood
technologies such as OpenPGP-based email encryption are not used by the vast
majority of people for reasons that have been understood for nearly a decade
and a half [7]. While there has been considerable progress in the deployment of
increased use of TLS and even IP-address level anonymity via the Tor project [1],
most people rely on insecure and centralized silos for email. There are few work-
ing solutions for encrypted and privacy-preserving email. While Tor provides
the best solution for IP-level anonymity, this purpose is defeated when users
rely on centralized email systems, where the danger of their communication be-
ing intercepted via disclosures by the service provider are considerable [1]. For
example, many users simply use Tor to ‘anonymize’ their access to email ser-
vices such as Gmail that can simply hand over their data, or even systems such
as riseup.net that likely have all outgoing and ingoing traffic monitored even if
the server itself refuses requests for user data. Although email is often sent over
an encrypted network channel via TLS and upgraded from an insecure channel
using STARTTLS, typically network traffic is not properly authenticated and
even network-level encryption tends to fail during mail transfer [2].
Beyond email, Off-the-Record messaging for chat works well, but requires
synchronous chat between two users,3 while Signal is not an open standard or
decentralized. [6]. High-profile efforts such as Mailpile are aimed at essentially re-
placing the user-experience of Thunderbird and Enigmail, not at actually solving
the underlying problems of key management and provisioning encrypted email.4
Although message security rests entirely on a foundation of authenticity, since
without proper validation of encryption keys a user cannot be assured of confi-
dentiality or integrity, current systems of establishing message authenticity are
so difficult to use that many users simply ignore this step. To achieve mass adop-
tion of encrypted email, the steps of key provisioning, key validation to determine
message authenticity, and managing the server-side must be done automatically
so that email is encrypted opportunistically. Opportunistic email encryption also
needs to include an excellent client-side user experience, particularly if there are
errors that the server cannot resolve.
Our solution to this problem is called LEAP, a recursive acronym for the
“LEAP Encryption Access Project.” LEAP is still in development, although
the core functionality of basic opportunistic encryption email is now available
for beta testing.5 The project source-code on Github is available to all.6 LEAP
infrastructure will be supported by providers such as riseup.net.
2 Goals and Requirements
2.1 Goal
The primary goal of LEAP is to provide easy-to-use software for end-to-end
encrypted communication between individual users. The long-term goals are that
the communication services should offer a user experience free of any ‘privacy tax’
on the user in the form of limited features as well as any additional cognitive load
and labor compared to non-encrypted communication. It should be backwards-
compatible with existing SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) email. Thus,
LEAP’s primary goal is enabling the use of OpenPGP-enabled SMTP, but in a
more secure and user-friendly way than commonly used today by toolsets such
as Thunderbird and Enigmail. Thus in addition, we have chosen to prioritize the
following secondary goals:
– Memorable user identifiers: Users should be able to utilize familiar and mem-
orable user handles such as username@domain that are typically already
used in email when identifying themselves for purposes of communication.
3 http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/
4 http://mailpile.is
5 To try, follow instructions on http://demo.bitmask.net.
6 https://github.com/leapcode/
– Resilience: The communication system as a whole should continue to func-
tion even if most of the organizations and infrastructure that constitute the
whole system have been eliminated or compromised by a malicious attacker.
– Untrusted : A third-party service provider should not have access to the con-
tent of a user’s communication (via hosting cleartext, decryption keys, or
passwords) and minimize the amount of metadata they can access to the
amount needed to route the message.
There are many other possible goals that end-to-end encrypted communica-
tions system wish to provide. There are a number of possible goals that we are
explicitly not addressed by LEAP at this time:
– Device protection: If a user’s client device is subject to an ongoing compro-
mise while the device is powered on, then LEAP does not offers security
benefits as the private key is stored on the device. Possible mitigations are
under investigation.
– Anonymity : The LEAP system does not offer anonymous communications
at this time as users and service providers are given stable identifiers. How-
ever, LEAP may be used in conjunction with IP anonymization such as Tor
and LEAP is currently exploring the feasibility of using mix networking for
anonymous messaging.
2.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, we are considering two distinct types of attackers, an active
server attacker that focuses on decrypting messages on the server, and a global
passive adversary that simply copies all messages in transit between servers
(encrypted or not). For attackers, the goal is both (1) to gain access to the
content of the encrypted messages and (2) to determine the social graph of
who is communicating to whom. For the former goal of decrypting messages,
attacking a single server with many clients makes more sense than attacking
many clients for most attackers. For this section, we will consider only the first
attacker, as the second requires advanced approaches such as mix-networking.
The active server attacker uses either technical attacks or legal means to
force a server to hand over the private keys of its users so the attacker can de-
crypt the encrypted messages. To prevent this, the private key material must not
reach or remain in cleartext form on any server. It should be that an attacker
cannot decrypt the encrypted message by compromising the server or placing
the server under compulsion. An example would be Lavabit, which had a single
point of failure in the form of the system administrator himself: Ladar Levinson
had access to the key material for all his users, defeating the purpose of having
end-to-end encrypted email.7 Strangely enough, other services such as Proton-
mail8 seem to be repeating this flawed model for encrypted messaging. Lastly,
7 https://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/lavabit-critique/
8 https://protonmail.ch
this is trivially true (as shown by the NSA Prism programme) for centralized
messaging services such as GMail that do not store the content of messages en-
crypted. Server seizures are a threat in the USA that legally resist backdoors,
such as recent seizures against a Mixminion anonymous re-mailer on riseup.net.9
In terms of the second global passive attacker who is aiming at collecting meta-
data, most systems today offer no protection. Given the difficulty of defending
against this attacker, our current system does not currently aim provide meta-
data anonymity from their perspective. That being said, LEAP aims not reveal
the social graph of a user via techniques for key validation such as the OpenPGP
keyservers that display the ‘web of trust’ of users to the public.
2.3 Requirements
When a system claims to offer security for a user’s communication data, typi-
cally the focus is on confidentiality and integrity. Although confidentiality and
integrity are certainly preconditions for any secure system, in order to achieve
high usability a public-key communication system should additionally focus on
these requirements:
– High data availability : Users expect to be able to access their data across
multiple devices with little delay and have the data backed up to redundant
cloud storage.
– Automatic public key authenticity : If key authentication is difficult, then
there is low effective confidentiality for any user who might be subject to
an active attack. Since existing systems of public key authentication for
messages are either very difficult for users or require a central authority, the
confidentiality of existing messaging system is often low in practice.
The LEAP architecture is designed around a federated model, like traditional
SMTP-based email or XMPP, where each user registers an account with a service
provider (that consists of one or more servers) of their choice and runs their
own client on a local device to connect to the provider in order to retrieve
encrypted e-mail. Both distributed (peer-to-peer) and centralized architectures
were considered, but both fell short of our requirements. A detailed analysis of
our approach in comparison to others such as is maintained online.10 In contrast
to LEAP’s design, competing encrypted e-mail services rely on centralized key
escrows or a web-browser that are vulnerable to an active server attacker. On a
high level, LEAP’s requirements are met in the following manner:
– High data availability: A user’s message data is client encrypted and syn-
chronized with redundant federated cloud servers and with a user’s other
devices. Their data quickly downloaded when needed and so not lost if a
user’s device is destroyed.
9 http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21186-FBI-Overreaches-with-May-First-
Riseup-Server-Seizure.html
10 https://leap.se/en/docs/tech/secure-email
– Automatic key authenticity: With the assistance of a network of federated
servers containing the latest public key information of their users, the user’s
client intelligently manages public keys automatically by following a series of
rules that embody best practices and so validate public keys to the greatest
extent possible. As the public key information of LEAP-enabled users is
kept redundantly by a number of different servers, the client can audit the
validation of a key without relying on a single trusted server.
– Unmappability: As much metadata is possible is stored so that the provider
has no access to this information. Key validation is done via Nicknym (as
described in Section 3.4) as to not reveal the social graph of users to unnec-
essary third-parties, unlike OpenPGP’s ‘web of trust’ keyservers. In future
work, LEAP will extend this to the metadata of messages in transit (includ-
ing size and timing information), by incorporating mix networking into the
delivery of messages and a CONIKS-style architecture for key validation [4].
2.4 General Design
The design of LEAP tackles each of the requirements for high data availability,
automatic key authenticity, and unmappability. The primary new contribution
of LEAP is tackling the problem of high data availability while defending against
active server attackers: How can we keep the key material from being inacces-
sible to the server and at the same time having the keys and data available for
synchronization across devices?
The problem can be broken down into a number of distinct components:
Server-side infrastructure, usable client software, and the fundamental protocols
needed to communicate between the server and the client. What is necessary
is to have the client and server actively work together in order to encrypt the
message, as to prevent the situation where private key materials stored only on
the server are only defended by weak defenses such as passwords. Simply storing
the private key on a single device of the user, as done by most encrypted mail
programs, is not enough as users need to access their email through multiple
devices and keep the state of their inbox synchronized. Thus the main problem
facing such a system is safely getting the correct keys onto users’ devices, a
problem known as key synchronization. This becomes an even more important
problem if best practices such as frequent key rotation are to be employed.
LEAP solves the problem of key synchronization through the installation of a
multi-purpose LEAP client application called Bitmask, that appears to the user
mainly as an OpenVPN client.11 However, there is more to Bitmask than just
a VPN. Inside of the Bitmask client are the routines for generating, validating,
and discovering keys as well as synchronizing keys and related material (such as
the status of messages being “read” across multiple devices). The LEAP client
appears to be a VPN as many users likely would install a VPN (but not special
‘key manager’ software) and the VPN provides additional security benefits by
11 http://openvpn.net/
creating an authenticated and encrypted channel for all traffic between the LEAP
client and server.
When a user installs a LEAP client, the LEAP client asks the user for a
username and master passphrase, and to select a LEAP-enabled provider. A
’recovery code’ is made for the device (currently a 22 digit code) that is used to
derive a device key. The first time that an user authenticates a new device against
that LEAP-enabled provider after installing a LEAP client, the keymanager on
the LEAP client will attempt to perform a Soledad synchronization (Soledad
is described in Section 3.2). If the user has created a new account and so no
valid keypair is found, the LEAP client will generate a public-private OpenPGP
keypair on the user’s device. After such generation is completed, the keypair will
be symmetrically encrypted with a key derived from the master passphrase and
the wrapped key will be uploaded to the remote Soledad replica in the server,
in order to let the user add new devices and synchronize them with Soledad.
For incoming email, messages are received by the service provider’s MX servers,
encrypted to the current user’s public key, and stored in the user’s database in
an incoming message queue. The LEAP client then fetches the incoming message
queue as part of a periodic Soledad synchronization, decrypting each message
and saving it in the user’s inbox, stored in the local Soledad database. The mail
module exposes the stored messages through a local IMAP server, so that the
messages can be accessed using any standard MUA.
Since email is distributed to the client and stored via the Soledad API, any
changes to the mailbox will eventually be synchronized to all devices. The muta-
ble parts of the messages and the attachments are kept in separate documents, so
that the sync overhead is kept low. Soledad allows for selective synchronization
so that header documents can be synchronized first, leaving the ability to down-
load attachments on the background or under demand, which will be specially
interesting for mobile.
For outgoing email, the LEAP client runs a thin SMTP proxy on the user’s
device, bound to localhost, and the mail user agent (MUA)12 is configured to
bind outgoing SMTP to localhost. When this SMTP proxy receives an email
from the MUA, it issues queries to a local keymanager (Nicknym agent) for
the user’s private key and public keys of all recipients. The message is then
signed, and encrypted to each recipient. If a recipient’s key is missing, email
goes out in cleartext (unless user has configured the LEAP client to send only
encrypted email). Finally, the message is relayed to provider’s SMTP relay. The
LEAP approach outlined is similar to the approach taken by Garfinkle [3] and
Symantec,13 although these systems do not include key discovery, key validation,
encryption of incoming messages, secure storage, or synchronization of email
among devices.
12 Such as Thunderbird, Evolution, or Outlook.
13 http://www.symantec.com/desktop-email-encryption
Fig. 1. Components of LEAP Email Architecture
3 The LEAP Architecture
In detail, the LEAP federated architecture consists of three-components: (1) a
server-side platform automation system; (2) an easy-to-use client application;
and (3) new protocols such as Soledad and Nicknym that allow the user to
place minimal trust in the provider, as well as well-known and standardized
protocols such as IMAP. These components are illustrated in Diagram 1.14 The
cryptographic details are also subject to change (in particular, migrating from
large RSA keys to Curve 25519 when possible) and are maintained online.15
The LEAP platform offers a set of automation tools to allow an organization
to deploy and manage a complete infrastructure for providing user communica-
tion services in the servers controlled by them. The LEAP client is an application
that runs on the user’s local device and is tightly bound to the server compo-
nents of the LEAP platform. The client is cross-platform, auto-configuring, and
auto-updating, with the initial configuration and updates verified via The Up-
14 Note that parts of Section 3 are modified versions of material available on the LEAP
wiki at http://leap.se/en/docs.
15 https://bitmask.net/en/features/cryptography
date Framework16 in order to prevent a compromised server from forcing new
key material or accessing the existing client key material via a compromised
update.
3.1 LEAP Platform
The “provider instance” is a self-contained encapsulation of everything about
an organization’s server infrastructure (except for actual user data). The LEAP
platform consists of a command line tool and a set of complementary puppet
recipes allow an organization to easily operate one or more clusters of servers to
provision LEAP-enabled services. With the LEAP command line tool, a system
administrator can rapidly deploy a large number of servers, each automatically
configured with the proper daemons, firewall, encrypted tunnels, and certificates.
LEAP Data Storage One design goal of the LEAP platform is for a service
provider to act as an ‘untrusted cloud’ where data are encrypted by the client
before being sent to the server, and we push as much of the communication
logic to the client as possible. There are a few cases where the server must
have knowledge about a user’s information, such as when resolving email aliases
or when processing support requests. Every user has a personal database for
storing client encrypted documents, like email and chat messages. In the current
implementation, data storage is handled by CouchDB although this may be
changed in future versions.
The unencrypted information stored on the server needed to resolve email,
including the database for routing incoming and outgoing email, is similar to
any traditional email provider, with the one exception that user accounts don’t
have traditional passwords. Mail is received via a Soledad synchronization ses-
sion (detailed in Section 3.2) and authenticated using Secure Remote Password
(SRP), a standardized password-authenticated key agreement (PAKE) mecha-
nism that can be strengthened via device keys.17 Mail is sent using SMTP with
standard SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) authentication us-
ing client certificates.18 In detail, the unencrypted database of user information
maintained by the service provider includes:
– username: The login name for the user. This is not necessarily the user
portion of ’user@domain.’
– SRP verifier: Akin to a hashed password, but used in SRP ‘zero-knowledge’
dual pass mutual authentication between client and server.
– uuid: Random internal identifier for internal usage.
– identities: One or more ’user@domain’ identities, with corresponding public
keys and separate authentication credentials for SMTP (stored as a finger-
print to an x.509 client certificate). Each identity has its own authentication
16 http://theupdateframework.com/
17 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2945
18 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4422
credentials so that the email headers show that the user authenticated with
the SMTP server using their identity username, not their real username.
Each identity includes delivery information, either to a uuid or to a third
party email address that messages should be forwarded to. One or more
devices are tied to an identity.
For email delivery, the receiving MX (Mail exchanger record) servers do not
have access to the entire database. They only have read-only access to ‘identi-
ties.’ This allows the implementation of the Nicknym protocol (described in Sec-
tion 3.4) for resolving pseudonyms. Additionally, there are several non-encrypted
databases containing the minimal information needed to connect user accounts
to optional support tickets and even billing details. The LEAP platform includes
a web application for user and administrator access to these non-encrypted
databases, although future research will hopefully be able to minimize if not
eliminate this information.
3.2 Soledad
Soledad (“Synchronization Of Locally Encrypted Data Among Devices”) is re-
sponsible for client-encrypting user data, keeping the data synchronized with
the copy on the server and on all the other devices of each user, and for pro-
viding local applications with a simple API for document storage, indexing, and
search that is akin to CouchDB and related document-centric NoSQL databases.
The document that is saved and synchronized with Soledad can be any struc-
tured JSON document, with binary attachments. Soledad is implemented on the
LEAP client to store email messages, the user’s public and private OpenPGP
keys, and a contact database of validated public keys. Soledad is based on U1DB,
but modified to support the encryption of both the local database replica and
every document before it is synchronized with the server.19 Local database en-
cryption is provided by a block-encrypted SQLite database20 via SQLcipher.21
Documents synchronized with the server are individually block encrypted using
a key produced via an HMAC of the unique document id and a long storage se-
cret. In order to prevent the server from sending forged or old documents, each
document record stored on the server includes an additional client-computed
MAC derived from the document id, the document revision number, and the
encrypted content. The server time-stamps each update of the database, so that
Soledad’s MAC and HMAC keys used to encrypt the client database can only
send the server new databases. Each time the LEAP client is online (both after
re-connecting with the LEAP platform and after each pre-set time interval), the
client re-synchronizes the messages and key material.
In addition to synchronizing public-private key materials and a contact list
of validated keys, Soledad is used to encrypt and synchronize email. This has the
19 https://one.ubuntu.com/developer/data/u1db/
20 https://sqlite.org/
21 http://sqlcipher.net/
benefit of not storing sensitive metadata on the server and allowing for search-
able locally-encrypted database of messages on the client side. For efficiency, a
single email is stored in several different documents (for example, for headers,
for attachments, and for the nested MIME structures). While in transit between
LEAP-enabled SMTP servers and the LEAP client, there are three different
forms of encryption that a single message is subject to:
1. Encrypted by sender, or on arrival by recipient’s service provider using
OpenPGP.
2. Decrypted from and re-encrypted in an SQLcipher database using AES block
encryption.
3. Individually re-encrypted for storage on a service provider that supports the
LEAP platform using block encryption with a nonce.
3.3 LEAP Client
The LEAP client (also known as Bitmask22) is a cross-platform application that
runs on a user’s own device and is responsible for all encryption of user data.
It currently includes the following components: Bitmask VPN, Soledad (multi-
device user data synchronization), Key Manager (Nicknym agent and contact
database), and email proxy (opportunistic email encryption). The client must be
installed in the user’s device before they can access any LEAP services (except
for user support via the web application). Written in Python (with QT, Twisted,
OpenVPN, SQLcipher), the LEAP client currently runs on Linux and Android,
with Windows and Mac being under development.23 When a user installs a
LEAP client, a first-run wizard walks the user through the simple process of
authenticating or registering a new account with the LEAP provider of their
choice, using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol so that a cleartext
copy of the password never reaches the server. The SRP encoded password can
also be strengthened by wrapping it with a device key and so stored multiple
times, once per device key. The password’s strength is assessed via zxcvbn.24 Note
that when a user authenticates with the client, via a username and password,
these credentials as provided are used to both authenticate with the service
provider (via SRP) and also to unlock locally encrypted secrets (via Soledad).
One threat would be that an active server attacker would compel a LEAP-
enabled server to push a malicious update to the clients to compromise their
keys. This threat applies equally to any browser or plug-in based approach, and
in fact to the installation of any software. LEAP employs mitigation strategies
to prevent this attack. When distributed through the self-contained bundles, the
client has auto-updating capabilities, using The Update Framework (TUF) to
update LEAP code and other library dependencies as needed using the same
Thandy library as deployed by Tor [5].25 Unlike other update systems, TUF
22 https://bitmask.net/
23 The Android version tends to lag behind development compared to the Linux version
due to the design having to be re-coded in Java.
24 https://github.com/dropbox/zxcvbn
25 https://gitweb.torproject.org/thandy.git.
updates are controlled by a timestamp file that is signed each day. This ensures
that the client will not miss an important update and cannot be pushed an old
or compromised update by an attacker. Updates to the LEAP client via TUF
require signatures from multiple keys, held by LEAP developers in different
jurisdictions. Lastly, LEAP has started work on a system of reproducible builds,
which is working in an automated fashion for Android and in the future should
apply to all other platforms.26
VPN The goal with LEAP’s VPN service is to provide an automatic, always
on, trouble-free way to encrypt a user’s network traffic. The VPN service en-
crypts all of a user’s traffic and works hard to prevent data leakage from DNS,
IPv6, and other common client misconfigurations that are not tackled by Open-
VPN via a strict egress firewall. Currently OpenVPN is used for the transport.
OpenVPN was selected because it is fast, open source, and cross-platform. In
the future, LEAP plans to add support for Tor as an alternate transport. We
believe LEAP is the only VPN that autoconfigures and auto-restarts when con-
nectivity is lost. When started, the LEAP client discovers the LEAP-enabled
service provider’s proxy gateways, fetches a short-lived X.509 client certificate
from the provider if necessary, and probes the network to attempt to connect. If
there are problems connecting, the LEAP VPN client will try different protocol
and port combinations to bypass common ISP firewall settings since VPN access
is typically blocked crudely by simple port and protocol rules rather than deep
packet inspection. In terms of deep packet inspection, obfsproxy27 integration is
under development to hide the VPN connection to an observer. By default, the
LEAP client will auto-connect the VPN service the next time a user starts the
computer if the encrypted proxy was switched on when the user the client quit
or the machine was shutdown. If network connectivity is lost while the proxy
is active, the LEAP client will automatically attempt to reconnect when the
network is again available. A firewall is also activated before launching the VPN
service, providing a fail-close mechanism that limits the unprotected access to
the network in case of client malfunction or crashes. Due to its stringent security
requirements, the LEAP VPN does not work when the user is behind a captive
network portal.
3.4 Nicknym Key Management
One of the main features of the LEAP system is to provide strong authentication
of public keys in a way that is easy for users. To do this, LEAP relies on a protocol
called Nicknym in the form of username@domain (similar to an email address).
Nicknym maps user nicknames to public keys. With Nicknym, the user is able to
think solely in terms of nicknames, while still being able to communicate with a
high degree of security (confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity). Another goal
26 See work by Debian on reproducible builds that LEAP is applying to its code:
https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds.
27 https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en
of Nicknym is to, unlike the OpenPGP ‘Web of Trust’ mechanism, not reveal
the social graph of the user to the public.28
Although various new key validation infrastructure schemes have been re-
cently proposed, most of the new opportunistic encrypted email projects have
proposed starting with some sort of “Trust On First Use,” (TOFU) but the term
itself is undefined. LEAP specifies generic rules for automatic key management
that can form a basis for defining a version of TOFU and to transition from
TOFU to more advanced forms of key validation. In particular, the rules try to
define when a user agent should use one public key over another. This section is
written from the point of view of Alice, a user who wants to send an encrypted
email to Bob, although she does not yet have his public key.
LEAP assumes the goal is to automate the process of binding an email ad-
dress to a public key. Alice knows Bob’s email address, but not his public key
and either Alice might be initiating contact with Bob or he might be initiat-
ing contact with her. Likewise, Bob might use an email provider that facilitates
key discovery and/or validation in some way, or he might not. Unless otherwise
specified, key in this text always means public key. A key directory is an online
service that stores public keys and allows clients to search for keys by address or
fingerprint. A key directory does not make any assertions regarding the validity
of an address and key binding. A key validation level is the level of confidence
the key manager has that it has the right key for a particular address, where key
registration is when a key manager assigns a validation level, being somewhat
analogous to adding a key to a user’s keyring. A key endorser is an organization
such as a LEAP provider that makes assertions regarding the binding of user-
name@domain address to public key, typically by signing public keys. When
supported, all such endorsement signatures must apply only to the uid corre-
sponding to the address being endorsed. Binding information is evidence that
the key manager uses to make an educated guess regarding what key to associate
with what email address. This information could come from the headers in an
email, a DNS lookup, a key endorser, and so on. A verified key transition is a
process where a key owner generates a new public/private key pair and signs
the new key with a prior key. An endorsement key is the public/private key pair
that a service provider or third party endorser uses to sign user keys. Currently,
LEAP implements these rules when encountering new keys or finding keys from
other providers.
LEAP Key manager rules
1. First contact: When a new key is first discovered for a particular address,
the key’s the highest validation level is registered.
2. Regular refresh: All keys are regularly refreshed to check for modified expi-
rations, or new subkeys, or new keys signed by old keys.
(a) This refresh should happens via an anonymizing mechanism (currently
Tor) in order to prevent targeted attacks on particular servers.
28 Details at https://leap.se/nicknym.
(b) The key should not be revoked before the expiration date of the key,
unless it can be proved that there is a new version of the key or the key
has been compromised.
3. Key replacement: A registered key must be replaced by a new key in one of
the following situations, and only these situations:
(a) Verified key transitions (when the new key is signed by the previously
registered key for same address).
(b) If the user manually verifies the fingerprint of the new key (using an
out-of-band authenticated channel).
(c) If the registered key is expired or revoked and the new key is of equal or
higher validation level.
(d) If the registered key has never been successfully used and the new key
has a higher validation level.
(e) If the registered key has no expiration date.
Previously registered keys must be retained by the key manager for the pur-
pose of signature authentication. However, these old keys are never used for
sending messages. A public key for Bob is considered successfully used by Alice
if and only if Alice has sent a message encrypted to the key and received an
authenticated response.
Validation levels A number of validation levels are described, from lowest to
highest validation level.
Weak chain: Bob’s key is obtained by Alice from a non-auditable source via a
weak chain. The chain of custody for ‘binding information’ is broken as at some
point the binding information was transmitted over a connection that was not
authenticated.
Provider trust : Alice obtains binding information for Bob’s key from Bob’s
service provider via a non-auditable source over a strong chain. By strong chain,
we mean that every connection in the chain used to determine the ‘binding
information’ from Bob’s provider to Alice is done over an authenticated channel.
To subvert this ‘provider-trust’ validation, an attacker must compromise Bob’s
service provider or a certificate authority (or parent zones when using DNSSEC),
so this level of validation places a high degree of trust on service providers and
CAs.
Provider endorsement : Alice is able to ask Bob’s service provider for the
key bound to Bob’s email address and Bob is able to audit these endorsements.
Rather than simple transport level authenticity, these endorsements are time
stamped signatures of Bob’s key for a particular email address. These signatures
are made using the provider’s ’endorsement key.’ Alice must obtained and reg-
ister the provider’s endorsement key with validation level at ’provider-trust’ or
higher. An auditable endorsing provider must follow certain rules:
– The keys a service provider endorses must be regularly audited by its users.
Alice has no idea if Bob’s key manager has actually audited Bob’s provider,
but Alice can know if the provider is written in such a way that the same
client libraries that allow for submitting keys to a provider allow auditing
of these keys. Otherwise, it is considered to be the same as ‘provider-trust’
validation.
– Neither Alice nor Bob should contact Bob’s service provider directly. Provider
endorsements should be queried through an anonymizing transport like Tor [1].
Without this, it is easy for provider to prevent Bob from auditing its endorse-
ments, and the validation level is the same as ‘provider-trust.’
Note that with provider endorsement, a service provider may summarily pub-
lish bogus keys for a user. Even if a user’s key manager detects this, the damage
may already be done. However, if a provider is suspected of being caught ‘cheat-
ing,’ the evidence should be submitted to a third-party endorser (ideally with
an audit log) so that can Bob (and other providers) can query the third-party,
as should happen during third-party endorsement and provider consensus. Re-
gardless, a provider endorsement is a higher level of validation than ‘provider
trust’ because there is a good chance that the provider would get caught if they
issue bogus keys, raising the cost for doing so.
Third-party endorsement : Alice asks a third-party key endorsing service for
binding information, using either an email address of key fingerprint as the search
term. This could involve asking a key endorser directly, via a proxy, or asking
a key directory that includes endorsement information from a key endorser. A
third-party key endorser must follow certain rules:
– The third-party key endorser must be regularly audited by the key manager
of users. If there are conflicts, the key should be reduced to ‘provider trust’
validation until the conflict is resolved.
– The key endorser must either require verified key transitions or require that
old keys expire before a new key is endorsed for an existing email address.
This is to give a key manager time to prevent the user’s service provider
from obtaining endorsements for bogus keys. If a key endorsement system
is not written in this way, Alice’s key manager must consider it to have the
same level of validation as ‘provider-endorsement.’
– Key endorsers should provide information about key endorsements to key
owners to the user through an authenticated channel not controlled by the
provider (such as Tor) so the user can detect possible ’cheating’ by their own
provider.
Third-party consensus: This is the same as third-party endorsement, but
Alice’s user agent has queried a quorum of third party endorsers and all their
endorsements for a particular user address agree.
Auditing : This works similar to third-party endorsement, but with better
ability to audit key endorsements. With historical auditing, a key endorser must
publish an append-only log of all their endorsements. Independent agents can
watch these logs to ensure new entries are always appended to old entries. The
benefit of this approach is that an endorser is not able to temporarily endorse
and publish a bogus key and then remove this key before Alice’s key manager
is able to check what key has been endorsed. The endorser could try to publish
an entire bogus log in order to endorse a bogus key, but this is very likely to be
eventually detected. As with other endorsement models, the endorsement key
must be bootstrapped using a validation level of provider trust or higher.
Fingerprint Verification: Alice has manually confirmed the validity of the
key by inspecting the full fingerprint or by using a short authentication string
with a limited time frame. For established endorsers like LEAP providers, this
authenticated key has to be then hard-coded as known by the software.
As currently written, Nicknym relies on an approach based on network per-
spectives as enabled by Tor (i.e. retrieving the key from multiple network loca-
tions given by Tor exit nodes) to detect endorser equivocation, which allows for
the possibility that the endorser could publish a bogus key for a short period
of time in order to evade detection although eventually a discrepancy would be
detected by other key endorsers (via third-party consensus) and the history of
endorsed keys via a CONIKS-style approach would also detect this attack [4].
Any endorser equivocation should be widely reported and proven via audit logs
so that the users of a malicious endorser can detect the attack. To mitigate
the problem of stolen keys (either by a malicious or compromised provider or a
third-party adversary), LEAP is working on a system where a user can contact
their service provider (revealing their identity) and prove their identity via a
one-time passphrase generated at installation of the LEAP client on a device in
order to revoke verified key transitions.
4 Current State and Future Work
As of September 2016, the current LEAP architecture provides a VPN service
and end-to-end encrypted e-mail service available via bitmask.net. The LEAP
platform, Soledad, Nicknym, and the basic Key Manager are currently complete.
However, there is still ongoing work on greater scalability and reliability for the
LEAP platform’s encrypted data-storage. On the side of the LEAP client, LEAP
is pursuing greater compatibility with existing IMAP clients, improved usability,
and better network probing for the VPN. In co-operation with Thoughtworks,
we are working on a custom user-interface called Pixelated29 to be bundled with
LEAP client for users looking for alternatives to existing e-mail clients. Immedi-
ate goals also include porting LEAP from Android and Unix-based environments
(Linux and MacOS) to iOS and Windows environments. Work is ongoing to im-
prove the key validation rules (including key verification revocation) and support
validation with multiple network perspectives. In terms of research, LEAP plans
to add both Tor and mix-networking for messaging in transit both in between
LEAP providers and clients to prevent metadata collection by passive global
attackers, support for CONIKS for key validation [4], the use of the Signal pro-
tocol or simplified variant between LEAP-enabled providers as a higher-security
alternative to SMTP with perfect forward secrecy [6], increased security for key
29 The source code for Pixelated is available here: https://github.com/pixelated-
project/.
material on the server and back-ups for stolen key material using threshold
password authenticated key exchange (TPAKE) and secret sharing (TPASS),
two-factor authentication for users to strengthen passwords for user authenti-
cation, and deploying reproducible builds. In the future, LEAP may expand its
basic federated infrastructure to also provide hosting for other end-to-end en-
crypted and traffic-analysis resistant services needed by users, such as chat and
voice-over-IP.
At this moment, email providers such as riseup.net provide centralized email
providers to tens of thousands of highly sensitive users such as activists that are
likely targets of surveillance. Likewise, many ordinary users and organizations
want to migrate from centralized silos that are easily compromised by programs
such as PRISM. Therefore, it is critical that technical solutions be provided
that work today with existing heavily-used protocols such as SMTP to combat
surveillance. The LEAP solution, by providing an integrated client and server
that stores all SMTP email encrypted without having the server have access to
the keys and that automates key management for the user, presents the first
open architecture for enabling widespread open federated end-to-end encryption
for email.
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